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Netherlands and compare the job motivation of employees born in 1950, who faced a substantial retrenchment
of their pension rights resulting from a pension reform in 2006, to that of slightly older employees who remained
entitled to more generous pension benefits. Job motivation is significantly lower among negatively reciprocal
employees who were affected by the reform. The adverse effect on job motivation is stronger for negative
reciprocal employees born very shortly after the cutoff date of January 1, 1950, as well as for those with many
unaffected colleagues, who perceive the policy change as being more unfair. The treatment effect is stronger
among workers who are more likely to hold their employer accountable for the drop in their pension rights.
Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2157.
Keywords : reciprocity; job motivation; retrenchment of pension rights
History : Received November 15, 2013; accepted November 30, 2014, by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
Published online in Articles in Advance August 17, 2015.
1. Introduction
Economists and psychologists have provided ample
evidence from controlled laboratory studies that reci-
procity is a key driver of human motivation (Bowles
2008).1 Several field experiments (e.g., Falk 2007, Falk
and Zehnder 2013) show that reciprocal motives have
a significant impact on human behavior outside styl-
ized laboratory environments. Theory predicts that
reciprocity also affects labor market outcomes (e.g.,
Akerlof 1982, Rabin 1993). Important implications
are, for example, that positively reciprocal employ-
ees increase their efforts above the minimum required
level when treated generously by their employers and
that negatively reciprocal workers retaliate against
1 Numerous studies show that individuals reciprocate trust in
investment games (Berg et al. 1995). Moreover, it is well docu-
mented that individuals are willing to reject unfair offers in ultima-
tum games, even at personal costs (e.g., Güth et al. 1982, Camerer
and Thaler 1995), and that participants in public good games are
prepared to punish free riders (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000).
their employers for unfair treatment, for example, by
reducing effort.
Previous empirical work on the role of reciprocity
in employment relationships focused largely on the
impact of positive reciprocity on workers’ effort
response in gift exchanges. Convincing evidence of
in-kind responses by workers (i.e., higher effort pro-
vision) to the friendly actions of employers (i.e., a
higher wage payment) has been found in stylized
labor markets in laboratory experiments (e.g., Fehr
et al. 1993, 1998; Brown et al. 2004). Evidence from
field experiments on the effect of positive reciprocity
in employment relationships is somewhat less con-
clusive.2 Field evidence on the impact of unfair treat-
ment on worker motivation and effort provision is
2 Despite the overwhelming evidence of reference-dependent fair-
ness concerns (e.g., Fehr et al. 1993, 2009), researchers still debate
on the extent to which employers’ generous treatment of workers
causes increased effort provision. Gneezy and List (2006) find that
an unexpected salary raise has only a short-lived positive effect
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more consistent. A fascinating case study by Krueger
and Mas (2004) documents that a labor strife at a
U.S. tire production site coincided with the produc-
tion of substantially lower-quality tires. This arguably
resulted from reduced effort and care of workers dur-
ing the strife, suggesting that harmful reciprocations
are important in actual labor market settings. Cor-
roborating findings are documented by Mas (2006,
2008), Kube et al. (2013), and Cohn et al. (2014).3
Related studies in psychology have also documented
that workers react to wage cuts by harming their
employer (see, e.g., Greenberg 1990). None of these
studies, however, ascertains whether the degree of an
individual’s negative reciprocity affects the strength
of his negative reaction when being treated unfairly.
Our study fills this gap. Since we have a direct
measure of employees’ negatively reciprocal inclina-
tions, we can push the analysis of the drivers of
reciprocal behavior one step further and establish
that negative reciprocal inclinations drive negative
reciprocal behavior. Using a regression discontinuity
design (Imbens and Lemieux 2008, Lee and Lemieux
2010), we analyze the impact of a retrenchment of
pension rights on job motivation and show that the
strength of an employee’s reaction to this unfair
treatment depends on the strength of his negative
reciprocal inclinations.4 The pension rights of Dutch
public sector employees born after December 31, 1949,
were curtailed by a law change that abolished the
tax deductibility of contributions to sectoral early
on work effort in a gift exchange game. Cohn et al. (2015) show
that an unexpected wage increase raises effort of workers who felt
underpaid at the baseline wage, but has no effect on effort provi-
sion of workers who felt paid fairly at the baseline wage. Bellemare
and Shearer (2009) documented that providing a bonus unrelated
to past productivity in a field experiment at a tree-planting firm has
a significant and positive effect on productivity. Kube et al. (2012)
demonstrate that nonmonetary gifts have a much stronger impact
on worker effort provision than monetary gifts. Complementary
correlational evidence for actual labor markets has been provided
by Dohmen et al. (2009). They analyzed survey data and showed
that measures of positively reciprocal dispositions of respondents
in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) study are significantly
correlated with higher wages and greater work effort.
3 Mas (2006) documented a deterioration of police performance in
the aftermath of adverse outcomes in final offer arbitrations for
police unions in New Jersey. Mas (2008) demonstrated that quar-
rels between a union and Caterpillar coincided with substantially
reduced quality of construction equipment produced by Caterpillar
during that period. Kube et al. (2013) showed that wage cuts have
a detrimental and persistent impact on the productivity of student
workers in a data entry job, whereas an equivalent wage increase
has no effect. In another field experiment, Cohn et al. (2014) found
that performance on the work task (selling promotion cards) dete-
riorated when wages were cut. They also demonstrated that the
drop in performance was more marked when the coworker’s wage
was not cut.
4 Regression discontinuity designs have recently also been applied
by Berger and Pope (2011) and Tucker and Zhang (2011).
retirement schemes. Workers born before 1950 were
exempted from this change. In the public sector, the
national government is both the initiator of the pen-
sion reform and the employer. For the public sec-
tor we can therefore exploit the specific situation
that, since the government initiated the policy change,
public sector employees born in 1950 are likely to
perceive their employer as directly responsible. The
retrenchment of pension rights of the younger cohorts
constitutes a breach of an informal agreement because
the prospect of early retirement with high pension
benefits has been emphasized as an attractive job
characteristic in the recruitment of public sector work-
ers since the second half of the 1970s.
We conjecture that workers born in 1950 who com-
pare their pension rights to their own status quo
before the policy change and to those who were
born in 1949 and still enjoy the older, more gener-
ous pension plan are likely to perceive the policy
change as unfair. We therefore expect that the treated
employees (i.e., those born in 1950) are, on average,
less motivated in their job than workers in our con-
trol group, who are slightly older (i.e., born in 1949)
but otherwise similar. Moreover, if negative recipro-
cal inclinations drive negative reciprocal behavior, we
should expect that among the treated workers, those
with strongly negatively reciprocal inclinations show
a stronger reaction to the retrenchment of their pen-
sion rights than their treated colleagues who have
only weak negatively reciprocal inclinations. Using
unique matched survey and administrative pension
fund data on male employees in the Dutch public sec-
tor who were born in either 1949 or 1950, we test
these hypotheses by comparing job motivation, a key
determinant of work effort, for employees affected by
the retrenchment of pension rights (treatment group)
with job motivation of unaffected employees born in
1949 (control group) and show that the strength of the
treatment effect depends on the strength of employ-
ees’ negative reciprocal inclinations.
We measure job motivation by a self-reported sur-
vey question.5 The predictive power of self-reported
job motivation for actual effort provision and per-
formance has been investigated in detail in both
the industrial-organizational psychology literature
and the literature on organizational and vocational
behavior. Various meta-analyses (e.g., Bateman and
Organ 1983, Scott and Taylor 1985, Judge et al.
2001, Riketta 2002, Harter et al. 2002, Cooper-Hakim
and Viswesvaran 2005, Harrison et al. 2006) have
demonstrated that positive self-reported job attitudes
5 Our data do not contain objective performance measures. In fact,
it is also difficult to define an objective performance measure that
applies to all different jobs in the public sector. Tasks typically
differ immensely across sectors and are often complex.
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of individual employees, such as job motivation, are
positively correlated to performance measures on an
individual or business-unit level.6 Another strand
of literature has examined the relationship between
motivation and labor-market success and found that
motivational variables are strongly correlated with
the future earnings and human capital investments of
employees (e.g., Dunifon and Duncan 1997, Bowles
et al. 2001).7
To measure reciprocal inclinations, we make use of
six survey questions by Perugini et al. (2003). In a
controlled laboratory study, they performed compre-
hensive validation tests for their reciprocity scale and
showed that the measure for negative reciprocity pre-
dicts behavior in ultimatum games.
Our result that workers’ reaction to unfair treat-
ment indeed depends on their disposition toward
negative reciprocity indicates that the aggregate
harmful effects of unfair treatment, which previous
studies have documented (e.g., Krueger and Mas
2004), are caused by the reaction of workers with neg-
atively reciprocal inclinations.8 Additional evidence
strongly supports the idea that the strength of neg-
atively reciprocal motives and the perception of the
degree of unfairness mediate the causal effect of
unfair treatment on job motivation. For example, neg-
atively reciprocal treated workers who were born
closer to the cutoff date (e.g., born in the first quar-
ter of 1950), and those employed in an organiza-
tion with relatively many untreated colleagues are
6 Several of these analyses distinguished between different types
of performance measures and found that job motivation increases
performance, irrespective of whether it was measured by supervi-
sory ratings, peer-subordinate ratings, or objective records, such as
lateness, absenteeism, punctuality, customer satisfaction, employee
turnover, or profit (e.g., Judge et al. 2001, Harter et al. 2002,
Harrison et al. 2006). Riketta (2008) performed a meta-analysis that
covers studies that exclusively used panel data and showed that
self-reported job attitudes are more likely to influence performance
than vice versa.
7 In the past two decades, researchers in strategic human re-
source (HR) management have developed the ability-motivation-
opportunity model, which predicts that employee performance
is a function of three essential components: ability, motivation,
and the opportunity to perform. Several empirical studies have
adopted and validated this conceptual framework by showing that
motivation-enhancing HR practices indeed increase individual per-
formance (e.g., Huselid 1995, Ichniowski et al. 1997, Batt 2002, Liao
et al. 2009, Gardner et al. 2011, Kehoe and Wright 2013). More-
over, it has been found that self-reported job motivation is indeed
a crucial mediator between these motivation-enhancing HR prac-
tices and the financial performance of organizations (Patterson et al.
2004, Jiang and Lepak 2012).
8 Our contribution goes beyond that of previous studies that have
used the same data set to analyze the effects of the pension reform
on training participation (Montizaan et al. 2009), mental health
(de Grip et al. 2012), and work attitudes (Montizaan and Vendrik
2014). None of these studies considered heterogeneous effects that
depend on negatively reciprocal inclinations.
the least motivated after the reform, indicating that
they perceive the policy change as particularly unfair.
Moreover, among the treated, job motivation is lower
among negatively reciprocal public sector employees
who work for the central government, most likely
because they hold their employer, the government
that implemented the policy change, directly account-
able for the retrenchment of their pension rights.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. The next section provides more details on the
exogenous shock in the Dutch public sectors’ pension
system that generates exogenous variation in the way
workers are treated. Section 3 describes the data and
presents a detailed analyses showing that the data
collection process did not generate potential selection
problems that may have hampered the validity of our
regression discontinuity design. Section 4 presents the
results, and §5 ends with some concluding remarks.
2. Reform of the Public Sector’s
Pension System
In 2006, a reform in the Dutch pension system abol-
ished the favorable tax deductibility of contributions
to early retirement schemes that are part of the
second pillar of the Dutch pension system for all
employees born in 1950 or later (for details, see Web
Appendix B, available as supplemental material at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2157).9 Employ-
ees born before 1950 who had been continuously
employed in the public sector since April 1, 1997,
remained entitled to the generous old pension
rights.10 The government’s intention was to provide
stronger incentives for younger cohorts to retire at an
older age. Those born in 1950 and thereafter suffered
from a dramatic loss of early retirement options. After
the reform, a typical employee born in 1950 or later
with 40 years of tenure attains a replacement rate of
only 64% when retiring early at the age of 62 years
and three months, which is substantially lower than
the replacement rate of 70% that applied to them
before the reform and that still applies to workers
born before 1950.11 The strong differential treatment
9 The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars: (1) a public
old age pension that is paid to all inhabitants aged 65 and older,
(2) a supplementary sectoral (or firm) pension, and (3) voluntary
private pension plans.
10 The abolition of this favorable tax treatment was not limited to
the public sector and also applied to workers in the private sec-
tor; however, the major difference between the sectors is that in the
public sector the national government is both the initiator of the
pension reform and the employer in the sectoral bargaining pro-
cess. This implies that public sector employees may hold their own
employer accountable for the drop in their pension rights.
11 To attain a replacement rate of 70%, workers who are affected
by the reform have to postpone retirement by one year and three
months.
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of workers born around January 1, 1950, came as a
surprise to public sector employees, when the reform
was announced on July 18, 2005.
The pension fund Algemeen Burgelijk Pensioen-
fonds (ABP), which covers all public sector workers,
launched a campaign in the second half of 2005 to
inform its members about the introduction of the new
pension system and to explain its financial implica-
tions. A special newsletter was devoted to the new
pension system in which unions, employer organiza-
tions, and the ABP jointly explained the new flexi-
ble pension scheme. All 1.2 million ABP participants
received a letter about the core characteristics of the
new scheme, and a complete digital service package
for public service employers was developed. There-
fore, one can assume that on January 1, 2006, most
public sector employees born after 1949 and their
employers were indeed familiar with the exogenous
shock in their pension rights.
Since details of the new pension system were only
communicated in the second half of 2005, there was
not much scope for workers born on January 1, 1950,
or later to fully offset the drop in their pension
benefits—that is, by engaging in extra savings plans—
because of the limited time horizon to retirement.
3. Data
3.1. Data Collection
We use survey data that we match to administrative
data for male employees in the public sector who
were born in 1949 or 1950.12 The administrative data
are from the ABP. The data contain detailed informa-
tion on individuals’ pension rights at the ABP, annual
wage income, and tenure in the public sector.
The survey data were gathered after the introduc-
tion of the new pension system. In January 2007, all
27,871 male public sector employees born in either
1949 or 1950 were invited to participate in our Inter-
net survey by requesting their e-mail addresses. The
invitation letter, sent by surface mail, conveyed gen-
eral information about the social usefulness of the
study but did not reveal any information about the
(motivation for the) research question or the nature
of our research strategy (e.g., we did not inform
potential participants that the invitation was sent
only to public sector employees born in 1949 and
1950). The letter also explicitly assured confidential-
ity, so that respondents need not fear repercussions
from responding in a socially undesired manner. In
March 2007, we invited the 11,458 male public sector
12 The survey and administrative data are only available for these
two specific birth cohorts. We focus on male employees because in
the Netherlands only a small, highly selective group of women in
the 1949 birth cohort does not have career breaks and is eligible for
exemption from the reform.
employees who had provided their contact details to
fill in the Web-based survey. In total, 7,739 individuals
completed the questionnaire in 2007. References to the
nature of our research question and research strategy
were also avoided in the survey itself. In March 2008,
we sent an e-mail invitation with a link to a second
Web-based survey to all individuals who had logged
on to the 2007 questionnaire. This time 6,078 respon-
dents completed the survey. In this second wave, we
asked detailed questions on reciprocal motivation, job
motivation, and retirement expectations.
In our analyses, we exclude workers employed in
certain burdensome occupations (e.g., firemen and
ambulance and police personnel), in which other
retirement schemes are in place that allow early retire-
ment without a substantial drop in income. In our
main analysis, we also restrict the sample to those
employees who continuously worked in the public
sector since 1997 (thereby excluding 260 employees
who are not eligible for the prereform early retirement
option even if they were born before 1950).13 Because
of item nonresponse for the variables of interest, the
estimation sample is further reduced to 5,287 men,
2,775 of whom were born in 1950 and constitute the
treatment group, whereas the other 2,512 men, born
in 1949, belong to the control group.
The dependent variable in our econometric analysis
is a self-assessed measure of job motivation. Respon-
dents were asked to indicate how well the follow-
ing statement applies to them personally: “At times,
I have difficulties motivating myself in my job.”
Answer categories ranged from 1 (“applies perfectly
to me”) to 5 (“does not apply to me at all”).
Our measure of reciprocity, one of the key explana-
tory variables in our analysis, is based on the reci-
procity scale developed and validated by Perugini
et al. (2003). These authors performed comprehensive
validation tests and assessed the predictive power
of their reciprocity scale for the behavior of par-
ticipants in ultimatum games in laboratory experi-
ments conducted in the United Kingdom and Italy.
We include the six items that have the highest load-
ings on the principal components for positive and
negative reciprocity and that were also included in
the 2005 SOEP wave (see Dohmen et al. 2009) for
the behavioral validity of these questions). Respon-
dents had to indicate on a five-point Likert scale
(1 means “does not apply to me at all” and 5 means
“applies perfectly to me”) how well they identified
themselves with each of the following six statements:
(1) “If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to
return it”; (2) “If I suffer a serious wrong, I will
take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what
the costs”; (3) “If somebody puts me in a difficult
13 In a robustness analysis we include the workers who did not
work continuously in the public sector since 1997.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Entire sample Born in 1949 Born in 1950 p-value
Take revenge for a serious wrong 3006 3006 3006 0078
410045 410045 410055
Retaliate for being put in a difficult position 2054 2054 2054 0089
400855 400845 400865
Reciprocate insult with an insult 2060 2060 2062 0085
400915 400905 400915
Reciprocate a favor 4029 4031 4027 0008
400645 400635 400645
Exert effort to help somebody who is kind 4011 4011 4011 0080
400625 400625 400625
Undergo personal costs to help someone who was helpful before 3073 3073 3072 0015
400705 400695 400715
Negative reciprocity (averaged) 2073 2074 2073 0096
400795 400785 400795
Positive reciprocity (averaged) 4004 4005 4004 0013
400515 400505 400515
Expected retirement benefit at age of 62 (in % of net present wage) 69002 71066 66062 0000
4110675 4110675 4110145
Extra pension savings in previous year (1 if savings increased) 0025 0022 0027 0000
400435 400415 400445
Yearly wage (in euros) 53,132 53,132 53,131 0030
(16,420) (15,957) (16,938)
Log size of organization 7013 7013 7013 0059
410785 410795 410775
Marital status (1 if married) 0092 0092 0091 0008
400285 400275 400295
Bad health (self-reported on five-point Likert scale) 2006 2007 2005 0045
400725 400725 400725
Number of observations 4,520 2,147 2,373
Notes. Sample standard deviations are in parentheses below sample averages. The measure of negative reciprocity is the individual’s agreement to the three
statements on the willingness to take revenge for a serious wrong, to retaliate for being put in a difficult position, and to respond to an insult with an insult.
The measure of positive reciprocity reflects the agreement to statements on the willingness to return a favor, to exert effort to somebody who was kind, and to
undergo personal costs to help someone who was helpful before. Both measures are based on the average of the three underlying items. Answers for the six
reciprocity questions are on a five-point Likert scale between 1 and 5, with 1 meaning “does not apply to me at all” and 5 meaning “applies perfectly to me.”
The expected retirement benefit at age of 62 is based on the following survey question: “Suppose you would retire at the age of 62. How large would your
pension benefit be as a percentage of your net wage income”? The yearly wage income is based on administrative data of the public sector’s pension fund.
position, I will do the same to him/her”; (4) “I go
out of my way to help somebody who has been kind
to me before”; (5) “If somebody offends me, I will
offend him/her back”; (6) “I am ready to undergo per-
sonal costs to help somebody who helped me before.”
Statements (2), (3), and (5) refer to negative reci-
procity; statements (1), (4), and (6) concern positive
reciprocity. We construct our measures of positive and
negative reciprocity by taking the arithmetic average
of a respondent’s answers to questions (2), (3), and (5)
and (1), (4), and (6), respectively.14
A relevant concern is how well these survey ques-
tions measure the behavioral reciprocal inclinations
of the individuals in our sample. Various factors
14 The questions on job motivation and reciprocity were not placed
directly after the questions on retirement expectations. The question
on job motivation was placed after a block of questions on training
participation. The reciprocity questions were placed after a block
of health questions.
such as strategic motives, self-serving biases, and
lack of attention can induce respondents to dis-
tort or unintentionally misreport their true recipro-
cal behavior (Camerer and Hogarth 1999). However,
for the following reasons we are confident that our
measures are valid indicators of reciprocity, albeit
measured with error. First, our reciprocity measures
are experimentally validated. Second, Dohmen et al.
(2009) showed that the survey measures of reci-
procity employed in this study are correlated with
behavioral outcomes in a way that is consistent
with theoretical predictions. Third, previous research
demonstrated the validity of survey questions about
preferences, attitudes, and behavior (e.g., Fehr et al.
2002, Bellemare and Kröger 2007, Dohmen et al. 2011,
Falk and Zehnder 2013).
3.2. Descriptives
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the estima-
tion sample (entire sample), and separately for the
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control group (born in 1949) and treatment group
(born in 1950). The last column shows the p-values for
the tests of the hypothesis that the treatment and con-
trol group are the same. We do not observe significant
differences in the average responses to each of the six
different reciprocity measures between the treatment
and control groups, indicating that the change in pen-
sion rights did not affect self-assessed reciprocal incli-
nations. The sample averages for the three items that
measure negative reciprocity range from 2.6 to 3.1 and
are smaller than the averages for the items measuring
positive reciprocity (4.3 to 3.7). A substantial number
of respondents report that the statements on positive
reciprocity apply to them perfectly, whereas respon-
dents identify, on average, less with the statements on
negative reciprocity. The variance within the negative
reciprocity measures is larger than within the positive
reciprocity measures.15
Table 1 also reports summary statistics for our
two reciprocity measures, which are constructed by
averaging agreement with the three statements con-
cerning positive and negative reciprocity, respectively.
Again, there are no differences in reciprocal behav-
ior between the treatment and control groups accord-
ing to these measures. There are also no significant
between-group differences in the other attributes used
in our analyses below, such as annual wage income,
the number of years during which workers have built
up their pension, marital status, self-reported health
status, educational attainment, and the employment
subsector.
Figure 1 plots birth quarter averages of job motiva-
tion and local polynomial estimates of job motivation
on birth date for the treatment and control groups
together, with 95% confidence intervals, and reveals
that there is a drop in job motivation around the birth
date that divides public sector employees into treat-
ment and control groups. This drop in job motivation
for workers who were born just after 1949 suggests
a causal impact of the retrenchment of pension rights
on the level of job motivation. These regression lines
indicate that the discontinuity around the birth date
January 1, 1950, is significant.
Ascribing the reduction in job motivation to the
retrenchment of pension rights requires that the
employees in our sample be aware of the drop in
pension rights brought about by the change in law.
To verify this, we compare expectations of the level
of pension benefits across the treatment and control
groups with the following question: “Suppose you
would retire at the age of 62. How large would your
pension benefit be as a percentage of your net wage
15 Reassuringly, the distributions of the answers to the six reci-
procity questions exhibit very similar patterns as those of respon-
dents’ answers in the SOEP (cf. Dohmen et al. 2009).
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Notes. This figure presents birth quarter averages of job motivation and a
local polynomial smooth of job motivation on birth date with a 95% confi-
dence interval, using a Epanechnikov kernel function. The bandwidth used
for the kernel function corresponds to the optimal bandwidth derived from
the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure. Job motivation is based on
the following five-level Likert item: “At times, I have difficulties motivating
myself in my job.” Answers categories ranged form 1 (“does applies per-
fectly to me”) to 5 (“does not apply to me at all”). Our sample consists of
two birth years where workers born in 1949 are entitled to the old pension
rules and workers born in 1950 are subject to the new pension rules. The
vertical line in the figure marks the threshold that divides the control from
the treatment group.
income”? The average responses shown in Table 1
make it clear that respondents who are affected by the
pension reform indeed expect a significantly lower
replacement rate. The mean difference in expected
retirement benefits between the treatment and con-
trol groups amounts to five percentage points, which
is remarkably close to the actual mean difference
between those groups (6%). Therefore, we can reason-
ably conclude that employees are aware of the conse-
quences of the new pension system.
3.3. Self-Selection
A relevant issue is whether our outcomes are affected
by self-selection. Nonrespondents might have differ-
ent characteristics than those who filled in the ques-
tionnaire, and therefore our results may not be per-
fectly generalizable to the entire male population of
public sector workers born in 1949 or 1950. In this
respect, the natural experimental approach used here
does not differ from the approaches of other stud-
ies that use nonexperimental survey data. However,
it is a much greater problem when nonresponse dif-
fers between the treatment and control groups, for
example, when, among the treated, those who have
the strongest feelings about the reform, arguably the
most negatively reciprocal, do respond more often.
In that situation, the similarity of the two groups is
no longer guaranteed, and the regression disconti-
nuity design loses its internal validity. We therefore
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examined in detail the similarity of the treated and
untreated respondents.
We are confident that the nonresponse does not dif-
fer between the treatment and control groups for sev-
eral reasons. First, as mentioned before, the potential
participants were not informed about the nature of
our question and research strategy, and the invitation
letter, as well as the survey itself, did not include ref-
erences to the pension reform. Second, we checked
whether there were deviations in the survey partici-
pation rate between the treatment and control groups.
For each year, the difference in participation rates is
extremely small.16 In 2007, 30.5% of all the workers in
the treatment group participated in the survey, versus
31.0% among the control group. In 2008, the survey
response rates were 21.6% for the treatment group
and 22.2% for the control group. Simple t-tests show
that these small differences in the participation rates
are statistically insignificant, with t-statistics of 0.97
in 2007 and 1.20 in 2008. Simple probit analyses also
confirm that selection into the survey in both survey
waves was not related to the treatment. These pro-
bit analyses include several control variables available
from the administrative data, such as work sector,
contractual work hours, birth month, and yearly wage
(in logs).17 Third, we found no evidence in Table 1
that the treated and untreated respondents differ in
their observable characteristics. Both job and personal
characteristics are similar across the two groups and
not significantly different from each other.18
Table 1 shows that there are no significant differ-
ences in the average responses of both groups to each
of the six different reciprocity measures and the aver-
ages of the three statements concerning positive and
negative reciprocity. Furthermore, Figures A2–A5 in
Web Appendix A show that the distributions of the
averages of our positive and negative reciprocity indi-
cators are strikingly similar for the treatment and
control groups. This indicates that negatively treated
workers, who arguably feel the strongest about the
reform, did not more often respond to the question-
naire and that our regression discontinuity approach
is internally valid.
16 See also Table A1 in Web Appendix A for a detailed overview of
the participation rates.
17 Figure A1 in Web Appendix A also shows that there is no dis-
continuity in the participation rate among the treatment threshold,
and that there are no significant discontinuities in the participation
rate between birth months.
18 Figure A8 in Web Appendix A presents birth quarter averages of
all control variables and a local polynomial smooth of these vari-
ables on birth date with a 95% confidence interval, and shows that
all control variables are continuous at the treatment threshold.
4. Estimation Results
4.1. Job Motivation, Treatment, and
Negative Reciprocity
We start our analysis by documenting a strong and
significant impact of unfair treatment on job moti-
vation in Table 2. Column (1) of the table shows
the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sions in which we relate job motivation to a treatment
dummy that takes the value 1 if the employee was
affected by the retrenchment in pension rights (i.e.,
born in 1950) and 0 otherwise. Since we have a sharp
discontinuity in pension rights and observe only a
small age difference between the treated and control
groups, this is equivalent to a regression discontinu-
ity approach (Van der Klaauw 2002).19 The result that
unfair worker treatment evokes a reduction in job
motivation is consistent with the evidence provided
by the previous literature (e.g., Krueger and Mas 2004;
Mas 2006, 2008). The main focus of this paper, how-
ever, is on the mechanism that generates the average
treatment effect. So far, the literature has implicitly
assumed that negative reciprocal inclinations drive
this result. At the same time, there is evidence of sub-
stantial heterogeneity in negative reciprocal motives.
If negative reciprocal inclinations drive the results, we
would expect workers with stronger negative recip-
rocal inclinations to react more strongly to the unfair
treatment and nonreciprocal workers to remain unaf-
fected by the treatment. We are therefore not inter-
ested in an average treatment effect, but in an inter-
action effect between the treatment dummy and the
indicator of negative reciprocity.
Column (2) of Table 2 shows OLS regressions in
which we relate job motivation to a treatment dummy,
the measures of negative and positive reciprocity, two
interaction terms between the measures of reciprocity
and the treatment dummy, age (relative to the dis-
continuity, in days divided by 365), and two interac-
tion terms between the measures of reciprocity and
age. Column (1) of Table 3 shows that the treat-
ment effect is indeed heterogeneous with respect to
reciprocal behavior. The coefficient of the interac-
tion between negative reciprocity and the treatment
dummy is negative and statistically significantly dif-
ferent from zero, indicating that the negative treat-
ment effect is significantly stronger for the negatively
reciprocal workers.20 More precisely, an increase of
19 Table A2 in Web Appendix A shows additional robustness anal-
yses on the relationship between job motivation and the treatment.
20 In control analyses, we estimated the impact of unfair treatment
on job motivation for the different quartiles of the distribution
of negative reciprocity. The comparison of the treatment dummy
across the different quartiles confirms that the treatment effect is
heterogenous with respect to reciprocal behavior: The difference in
job motivation is highest and statistically significant among treated
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Table 2 Negative Reciprocity, Treatment, and Job Motivation: OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Negative reciprocity × Treatment −00173∗∗ −00173∗∗ −00174∗∗ −00228∗∗ −00192∗∗
4000805 4000805 4000805 4001065 4000855
Positive reciprocity × Treatment −00038 −00038 −00030 00053 −00040
4001265 4001265 4001275 4001455 4001345
Negative reciprocity −00107∗∗ −00107∗∗ −00103∗∗ −00075 −00087∗
4000465 4000465 4000525 4000635 4000505
Positive reciprocity 00016 00016 −00018 −00060 00019
4000735 4000735 4000835 4000915 4000785
Treatment −00163∗∗∗ 00465 00467 00435 00278 00541
4000635 4005295 4005305 4005325 4005875 4005645
Age 00150∗∗∗ −00002 −00007 00015 00364 −00106
4000545 4004545 4004615 4004565 4007185 4004885
Age × Treatment 00007
4001095
Age × Negative reciprocity 00060 00060 00072 00052 00061
4000705 4000705 4001005 4001045 4000745
Age × Positive reciprocity −00001 −00001 −00095 −00068 00017
4001075 4001085 4001535 4001555 4001155
Age2 −00303 −00324
4004135 4004145
Age2 × Negative reciprocity 00001 −00022
4000065 4000315
Age2 × Positive reciprocity −00007 00027
4000085 4000315
Age3 −00378
4006235
Age3 × Negative reciprocity −00001
4000015
Age3 × Positive reciprocity 00001
4000015
Number of years contributed to the pension fund −00004
4000035
Log yearly wage 00287∗∗∗
4000895
Organization size 00005
4000155
Married 00149∗∗
4000615
Constant 3.418∗∗∗ 30652∗∗∗ 30650∗∗∗ 30771∗∗∗ 30853∗∗∗ 00329
4000365 4003075 4003105 4003475 4003705 4100315
Observations 5,287 5,182 5,182 5,182 5,182 4,524
Notes. The measures of negative and positive reciprocity used as explanatory variables in the regressions are constructed by taking the average of the three
underlying items. Additional control variables in the estimations in column (6) are educational levels and sector fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0010; ∗∗p < 0005; ∗∗∗p < 0001.
one standard deviation on the negative reciprocity
scale (0.79) reduces job motivation of treated work-
ers by 0.136. Table 3 also shows that negative reci-
procity generally reduces the job motivation of all
workers significantly, whereas positive reciprocity has
workers in the upper quartile of the negative reciprocity distri-
bution and lowest among the least negatively reciprocal treated
workers.
no significant impact. We find, as can be expected,
that the interaction between positive reciprocity and
the treatment variable has no effect on the level of job
motivation.
Columns (3)–(6) of Table 2 show that our key result,
that the reduction in job motivation of workers whose
pension rights are curbed depends on the level of
their negatively reciprocal inclinations, is robust to the
inclusion of an interaction between age and treatment,
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Table 3 Treatment Effect on Job Motivation: Results for Different Birth
Date Bandwidths
(1) (2)
I 1950 vs. II–IV 1950 vs.
IV 1949 IV 1949
Negative reciprocity × Treatment −00354∗∗ −00123
4001605 4001265
Positive reciprocity × Treatment 00128 −00057
4002625 4001965
Negative reciprocity −00011 −00095
4000925 4000625
Positive reciprocity −00069 00050
4001535 4001015
Treatment 00565 00377
4100935 4008265
Age 10166 00290
4308355 4009265
Age × Negative reciprocity 00644 −00036
4005625 4001465
Age × Positive reciprocity −00966 −00004
4009105 4002185
Constant 30601∗∗∗ 30494∗∗∗
4006415 4004275
Observations 1,280 2,526
Notes. OLS estimates are shown. In column (1), workers born in the first
quarter of 1950 are compared to workers in the control group who were born
in the fourth quarter of 1949, which corresponds to the optimal bandwidth
that we derived by implementing the procedure of Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012). Column (2) compares workers born in the second, third, or fourth
quarter of 1950 with those born in the fourth quarter of 1949. Standard errors
are in parentheses.
∗∗p < 0005; ∗∗∗p < 0001.
and higher-order age polynomials.21 Column (6) fur-
ther shows that our key result remains when control
variables are included (including annual wage income
(in logs), the number of years in which workers have
built up their pension, marital status, educational
attainment, and employment subsector).22 An increase
of one standard deviation in the negative reciprocity
scale now reduces job motivation of treated workers
by 0.152, which is equivalent to having an annual
wage that is 0.5% lower.
21 We also estimated models in which we additionally interacted
age with the two interaction terms between the measures of
reciprocity and the treatment dummy. Although multicollinear-
ity issues arise for the positive reciprocity indicator, we find that
the coefficient of the interaction term between negative reciprocity
and the treatment dummy is robust to the inclusion of these
interactions.
22 The policy has an impact only on the workers who choose the
early retirement scheme. Because most workers retired at the age of
62 or younger before 2006, they are indeed curtailed in their early
retirement plans. However, we included the expected retirement
age and its interaction with negative reciprocity in an additional
analysis to control for early retirement preferences. We found that
the coefficient of the interaction between treatment and negative
reciprocity is robust to the inclusion of these variables.
Table A3 in Web Appendix A shows that the results
presented in Table 2 are also robust to the estimation
technique: Ordered probit estimates that deal with the
discreteness of job motivation lead to exactly the same
conclusion.23 Furthermore, Table A4 in Web Appendix
A shows that the interaction effect between the three
separate individual negative reciprocity items and the
treatment dummy on job motivation is negative for
all three items and statistical significant for the first
two items.24
4.2. Perceived Unfairness of Policy Change
Until now, we have implicitly presupposed that the
perceived unfairness brought about by the retrench-
ment in pension rights is the same among all treated
workers. However, there may be differences in per-
ceived unfairness. We would expect that those who
feel treated most unfairly among the negatively recip-
rocal react more strongly to the policy change. Unfor-
tunately, we do not have a direct measure of per-
ceived unfairness, but it is plausible to assume that
workers who were born only shortly after the treat-
ment threshold perceive the policy change as more
unfair; they compare their pension rights to the rights
of those born just a few days earlier but who still
enjoy the older more generous plan. Accordingly, we
expect that strongly negatively reciprocal workers in
this specific group will be more demotivated than
workers born later in 1950.
We test this conjecture by comparing the job moti-
vation of workers born in different quarters in 1950.25
The treatment group in column (1) of Table 3 consists
23 The results are also robust to the use of a semi-nonparametric
estimator for a series of generalized models that nest the ordered
probit model and thereby relax the distributional assumptions in
that model (see Stewart 2004).
24 In additional robustness checks, we investigate whether our
results are sensitive to the construction of our reciprocity measures.
We estimate ordered probit models, including alternative measures
of negative and positive reciprocity constructed based on principal
component analysis on the six underlying items, and find that the
interaction effect between negative reciprocity and the treatment
group remains highly significant.
25 We also checked whether the effect of the interaction between
the treatment dummy and negative reciprocity can be attributed
to quarter-of-birth effects. We reestimated our preferred specifica-
tion for a restricted sample of employees that includes only those
born in the first quarter of 1949 and those born in the first quar-
ter of 1950. Moreover, we estimated a specification in which we
replaced the birth date variable by birth quarter dummies. In both
cases, we find that the interaction effect between reciprocity and
the treatment dummy remains strongly significant. These results
indicate that quarter-of-birth effects are very unlikely to drive the
results. This conclusion is supported by Figures A6 and A7 in Web
Appendix A, which plot birth quarter averages of job motivation
and local polynomial estimates of job motivation on birth date for
the treatment and control groups together (with 95% confidence
intervals) for employees who score above and below the median of
the negative reciprocity scale, respectively. If seasonality caused the
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of workers who were born in the first quarter of 1950,
whereas the treatment group in column (2) consists
of workers born in the second, third, or fourth quar-
ter of 1950. In both columns, the control group con-
sists of those born in the fourth quarter of 1949. The
bandwidth selection in column (1) corresponds to the
optimal bandwidth that we derived by implementing
the procedure of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
This procedure enables the calculation of the opti-
mal bandwidth for regression discontinuity designs
through the minimization of an expected squared
error loss criterion.26
Table 3 shows that our results are robust to ap-
plying the optimal bandwidth derived by the pro-
cedure of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and
confirms our expectation that negatively reciprocal
workers born on or just after January 1, 1950, are
more demotivated than workers born later that year.
The coefficient of the interaction term between neg-
ative reciprocity and the treatment variable remains
substantial and significant in column (1), whereas the
negative effect for workers born in later quarters of
1950 is smaller (column (2)). However, a regression on
the whole sample in which we interact the model with
a dummy variable measuring whether employees are
born in the first quarter of 1950 indicates that the dif-
ference between the coefficients in both regressions is
not statistically significant (the coefficient of the triple
interaction between birth quarter, negative reciprocity,
and treatment is −0.51, with a p-value of 0.582).27
drop in job motivation, instead of the treatment, one would expect
the slope of the relationship between job motivation and the birth
date to be similar for strongly negative reciprocal employees and
for those who have less strongly negatively reciprocal inclinations.
In particular, one would expect the exact same pattern around the
cutoff date. The figures, however, show that this is clearly not the
case: whereas there is a strong discontinuity in job motivation at
the cutoff date for employees with above-median negatively recip-
rocal inclinations, there is no evidence of a significant drop in job
motivation for employees with below-median negatively reciprocal
inclinations.
26 The idea behind the procedure of Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) is that the optimal bandwidth should increase when the vari-
ance in outcomes increases at the cutoff, when the density of the
forcing variable (age) is smaller, or when the shapes of the curves
on both sides of the cutoff becomes increasingly symmetrical.
27 It is conceivable that the degree to which workers feel affected by
the pension reform depends on the perceived costs. These costs in
turn depend on retirement expectations and retirement intentions.
In particular, we hypothesize that treated workers who expect a
relatively low pension after the reform, or who expect to work
relatively longer, feel more strongly affected by the retrenchment
of their pension rights than treated workers who expect to be
affected less strongly in terms of drop in pension wealth. We exam-
ined this hypothesis by assessing (1) whether job motivation is
lower for treated negatively reciprocal employees who expect to
receive a pension benefit below the median in the treatment group
than for negatively reciprocal employees who expect to receive a
It is also intuitive to assume that the extent to which
colleagues in a worker’s organization suffer from the
reform affects the perceived fairness of the policy
change. Since workers tend to compare the rewards of
their efforts to those their colleagues receive, we con-
jecture that treated employees suffer more from the
reform the higher the fraction of untreated employ-
ees working in their organization (see also Fliess-
bach et al. 2007, Clark and Senik 2010, Gächter et al.
2013). To construct a proxy for the degree of social
comparison, we rely on administrative data to cal-
culate for each public sector organization the frac-
tion of untreated employees born in 1949 and the
total number of workers in the organization.28 We
then run separate regressions for workers in organi-
zations whose share of untreated workers is below
the median and those in organizations whose share of
untreated workers is at or above the median. Table 4
shows that the coefficient of the interaction term
between the treatment dummy and the negative reci-
procity measure is almost four times as large for the
group of workers who have a higher share of col-
leagues who are unaffected by the reform. A regres-
sion analysis in which we interact the model with
a dummy variable that indicates whether employ-
ees work in organizations whose share of untreated
workers is above the median shows that this differ-
ence is significant at the 10% level (the coefficient of
the triple interaction between the share of untreated
colleagues, negative reciprocity, and the treatment is
−0.154 with a p-value of 0.065). This finding corrob-
orates the hypothesis that the perception of being
treated unfairly causes negatively reciprocal employ-
ees to retaliate against their employer by providing
less effort.29
4.3. The Employer–Employee Relation
Employer accountability for unfair treatment is a pre-
condition for the directed retaliation of workers. We
pension benefit above the median in the treatment group, and (2)
whether job motivation is lower for treated negatively reciprocal
employees who expect that they have to postpone their retirement
due to the reform for longer than the median employee in the
treatment group. The results indeed show that job motivation is
lowest among treated negatively reciprocal employees who expect
low pensions and who expect they have to work longer due to
the reform.
28 Unfortunately, we do not have administrative data on the age dis-
tribution of the total workforce in organizations. We can therefore
only look at the fraction of untreated employees who were born
in 1949.
29 Using the same data as we use, de Grip et al. (2012) recently
showed that the unexpected drop in pension rights also increases
the likelihood of becoming depressed. We checked whether the
lower job motivation of treated workers could be a byproduct of
mental health deterioration and find that adding the depression
rate as a control variable to our analyses does not change our
key result.
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Table 4 Treatment Effect on Job Motivation: Social Comparisons
(1) (2)
Percentage Percentage
untreated untreated
colleagues colleagues
above median below median
Negative reciprocity × Treatment −00269∗∗ −00074
4001155 4001165
Positive reciprocity × Treatment 00090 −00169
4001855 4001795
Negative reciprocity −00089 −00118∗
4000655 4000695
Positive reciprocity −00031 00038
4001045 4001075
Treatment 00220 00750
4007845 4007485
Age 00603 −00572
4006685 4006385
Age × Negative reciprocity 00075 00012
4001005 4001015
Age × Positive reciprocity −00163 00162
4001575 4001525
Constant 30777∗∗∗ 30594∗∗∗
4004365 4004505
Observations 2,542 2,472
Notes. All columns show results that are based on OLS estimates. We use
administrative data on the total number of workers in the organization in
which each employee is working to construct proxies for the incidence of
social comparisons in the organization. We determine whether treated work-
ers who were born in 1950 are working in an organization in which the group
of untreated workers who were born in 1949 is comparatively large (percent-
age untreated above or under median). Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0010; ∗∗p < 0005; ∗∗∗p < 0001.
therefore expect negatively reciprocal workers who
hold their employer responsible for unfair treatment
to purposefully retaliate against their employer. It is
very likely that public sector employees hold their
employer responsible for the retrenchment of pension
rights, because the government, which is regarded
as the public sector’s corporate management, initi-
ated the pension reform by abolishing the favorable
tax treatment. This accountability in management is
an important reason for focusing on public sector
employees. Nevertheless, it seems straightforward to
conjecture that the extent to which employees hold
their employer responsible may differ across the dif-
ferent Dutch public subsectors.30 Since the govern-
ment initiated the policy reform, it is plausible to con-
30 The 15 subsectors are as follows: the national government depart-
ments; defense (only civilian personnel); provinces; municipali-
ties; the judiciary; primary and secondary education; intermediate
vocational education; higher vocational education; universities;
the research and scientific policy sector; teaching hospitals; dis-
trict water boards; water, energy, and public utilities; voluntary
members (including ABP and public transport); and a remaining
category.
jecture that civil servants who work for the govern-
ment most strongly assign the blame for the unfair
treatment directly to their own employer. Conse-
quently, we expect that the treatment effect is greater
among negatively reciprocal workers in the govern-
ment departments.31
Estimating the impact of the reform separately for
workers employed in the national government, other
governmental sectors, and those in the education sec-
tor and privatized sector (e.g., water, energy and
public utilities; public transport companies), we find
that only the coefficient of the interaction between
the treatment term and our indicator for negative
reciprocity is statistically significant, and that it is
also much greater for employees in the govern-
ment departments than in the other sectors, as a
comparison of OLS estimates in columns (1)–(4) of
Table 5 reveals. A regression on the whole sample in
which we interact with a dummy variable measuring
whether employees work in the national government
indicates that treated employees in the national gov-
ernment with negatively reciprocal inclinations have
a significantly lower job motivation than employees
in the other sectors (coefficient of the triple interaction
between sector, negative reciprocity, and treatment is
−0.214 with a p-value of 0.039). This confirms the con-
jecture that employees who can directly associate the
unfair treatment to their own employer show stronger
negative reciprocal behavior through a reduction in
job motivation.
4.3.1. Workers with Career Breaks. The results
of further robustness checks shown in Table A5 in
Web Appendix A buttress our findings. This analy-
sis includes workers with career breaks after April
1997. Although it is conceivable that these workers’
career interruptions were caused by unobserved indi-
vidual characteristics that may also be related to recip-
rocal behavior, the inclusion of these workers intro-
duces an additional treatment group. Remember that
the legislative change also curtailed the pensions of
those born in 1949 and before if they did not work
continuously in the public sector since April 1997.
Columns (1) (without control variables) and (3) (with
control variables) present estimation results only for
workers born in 1949. The treatment dummy equals
one for workers born in 1949 but not entitled to the
old pension rights since they did not work continu-
ously since April 1997, whereas the dummy is zero for
all workers in 1949 who remain entitled. The estima-
tion results show a significant and negative coefficient
of the interaction between the treatment variable and
negative reciprocity when control variables are added.
31 We checked whether workers in the different subsectors differ
with respect to negative reciprocal inclinations, but found that such
differences are very small and statistically not significant.
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Table 5 Treatment Effect on Job Motivation: Heterogenous Sector Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
National Other governmental Education Privatized
government sectors sectors sectors
Negative reciprocity × Treatment −00429∗∗ −00158 −00044 −00075
4001835 4001475 4001295 4002665
Positive reciprocity × Treatment 00445 −00114 −00217 −00286
4002855 4002325 4002025 4004495
Negative reciprocity 00076 −00175∗∗ −00144∗ −00224
4001085 4000895 4000745 4001505
Positive reciprocity −00148 00005 00113 00199
4001675 4001355 4001175 4002565
Treatment −00930 00817 00871 10383
4101825 4009515 4008635 4108345
Age 10840∗ −00202 −00725 −00668
4100205 4008015 4007635 4104695
Negative reciprocity × Age 00136 00093 −00087 00177
4001615 4001275 4001135 4002255
Positive reciprocity × Age −00462∗ 00009 00253 00030
4002455 4001935 4001765 4003635
Constant 30973∗∗∗ 30911∗∗∗ 30248∗∗∗ 30144∗∗∗
4006825 4005515 4005025 4100555
Observations 1,014 1,462 2,038 500
Notes. OLS estimates are given, with standard errors in parentheses. The three subsectors that form the national
government are the national government, provinces, and voluntary members (which includes ABP). The other gov-
ernmental sectors are municipalities, the judiciary, defense (only civilian personnel), district water boards, and
teaching hospitals. The education sectors include primary and secondary education, intermediate vocational educa-
tion, higher vocational education, universities, and the research and scientific policy sector. The privatized sectors
include water, energy and public utilities, and the remaining category.
∗p < 0010; ∗∗p < 0005; ∗∗∗p < 0001.
Therefore, for this specific treatment group, we also
find that primarily negatively reciprocal workers with
curtailed pension rights are strongly demotivated.
Columns (2) (without control variables) and (4)
(with control variables) of Table A5 contain estimation
results for the full 1949 and 1950 sample and include
two treatment dummy variables. The first treatment
dummy equals one for workers born in 1949 and not
entitled to the old pension rights, and zero otherwise.
The second treatment dummy equals one if the work-
ers were born in 1950, and zero if they were born
in 1949. The estimation results show that both inter-
actions between the treatment dummy variables and
negative reciprocity are negative and significantly dif-
ferent from zero in the specification that includes the
control variables. Moreover, the sizes of coefficients
of both treatment dummy variables are remarkably
similar.
5. Conclusion
This paper shows that reciprocity is an important
determinant of job motivation. Using a natural experi-
ment, we find that a decrease in pension rights is asso-
ciated with lower job motivation among negatively
reciprocal employees. Moreover, negatively reciprocal
workers born in the first three months of 1950 are
more demotivated than those born later in the year,
plausibly because the former perceive the differential
tax treatment as more unfair because their age hardly
differs from that of those not affected by the reform.
Moreover, we observe that the coefficient of the inter-
action term between the treatment dummy and nega-
tive reciprocity is substantially larger for workers who
have a higher share of colleagues who are not covered
by the reform. We also find that negatively recipro-
cal workers employed by the national government,
i.e., those who can directly associate their unfair treat-
ment to their own employer, have lower job motiva-
tion than those employed in other public subsectors.
Furthermore, our results are robust to the use of alter-
native estimation methods.
Our findings indicate that pension reforms in-
tended to increase labor force participation can be
distorted by reducing job motivation of negatively
reciprocal workers who feel unfairly treated. There-
fore, it is crucial to think of reform designs that
provide less scope for being perceived as unfair by
particular groups. In the specific example of tax
legislation affecting pension rights, an alternative
design that entails smaller discontinuous differences
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in pension rights would arguably cause less disrup-
tion in terms of negatively reciprocal responses.
Our findings complement the literature in impor-
tant ways. First, we exploit exogenous variation in
unfair worker treatment to shed light on the nature of
the relationship between unfair worker treatment and
undesired worker response. In accordance with an
ultimatum game, the drop in motivation can be inter-
preted as the sanctioning of unkind or hostile actions
(e.g., Güth et al. 1982, Camerer and Thaler 1995). Our
evidence shows that negatively reciprocal individu-
als not only sanction actions they perceive as unkind
or hostile in laboratory settings, but behave similarly
when they feel treated unfairly by their employers.
Second, we use a direct measure of reciprocal incli-
nation to test whether the response of workers is
brought about by negative reciprocal motives, and we
provide evidence for a causal link between negatively
reciprocal inclinations and reductions in job motiva-
tion. Third, we show that heterogeneity in negatively
reciprocal inclinations leads to heterogeneity in the
job motivation of workers who feel treated unfairly.
These findings are fundamental, since they indicate
that reciprocal behavior is strongly driven by social
motives.
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